

Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy



Panel Report

#26

NSC review(s) completed.

18.1

SECRET

SECRET

Psychological
Aspects of
United States
Strategy



Panel Report

NOVEMBER 1955

SECRET

SECRET

November 29, 1955
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

On August 16 you invited the twelve persons listed below to participate in a group study and review of the psychological aspects of future U.S. strategy. You asked that a report be developed to recommend the means and methods best calculated to achieve U.S. objectives, taking into consideration the necessity for an integrated national program within which long-term military, economic, technological, and ideological programs could be developed.

As your designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I transmit herewith the report of our panel. Although the focus of this report is psychological, it has not been possible to avoid a good deal of consideration of economic, political and military policies and programs that have a strong bearing on attitudes and outlooks both within the Free World and the Soviet orbit. This is because the net impact of all policies and programs is, at least in part, psychological. The report represents the agreed views of all the panel members. There are also available to you, for such use as they may serve, certain papers prepared by individual members as preliminary contributions to the final report. These papers are not to be considered as part of our report, but we commend them for their individual ideas.

I should emphasize a major premise of our report. We believe that the Free World is presently engaged in a vital struggle against the forces of Communism, a struggle which requires a sustained U.S. effort to avoid jeopardizing the future of the nation and of the Free World.

The four principal actions we deem urgent and vital are:

1. Explaining to the people of the United States the gravity of the world situation and spelling out what is required to overcome it.
2. Increasing the military budget to provide for the improvement of the air defense of North America, for the establishment of an acceptable air defense of Western Europe, and for development of a greater capability to deter limited war and to deal with it if it occurs.

SECRET

3. Providing the leadership, on a continuing basis, for Free World political, economic, and cultural common action to achieve dynamic growth, thus eliminating vulnerabilities to Communism.

4. Continually applying pressure on the Soviet bloc to expose the insincerity of their intentions and tactics.

I wish to express our appreciation for the contributions made by governmental officials from various departments and agencies. Without their briefings at our meetings at Washington in August and without their participation at our discussions at Quantico in September, we would have lacked the intimate, timely knowledge of current problems necessary to completion of this task.

At this point I wish to make clear that none of the panel members believes that this report is altogether original with the panel. We know that many of the points covered have been at some time discussed or advanced by members of the various departments of the U.S. Government. We also realize that most of the programs recommended in the report are being considered or are being implemented in various ways. We do believe, however, that proper emphasis and full governmental coordination are lacking in many areas.

Finally, I also wish to express the appreciation of all the panel members for the wonderful cooperation of your entire staff, who have worked night and day to make this report possible. Without their help the report could not have been produced on the schedule requested.

Thank you for this opportunity to serve.



Frederick L. Anderson
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Panel Chairman

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

SECRET

lv

SECRET

PANEL MEMBERS

Mr. C. D. Jackson
Time, Incorporated

Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University

Colonel George A. Lincoln
Professor of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy

Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger
School of Advanced International
Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

Mr. Stacy May
Consulting Economist

Dr. Max F. Millikan
Director, The Center for International
Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Phillip E. Mosely
Director of Studies
Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. George Pettee
Assistant Director, Operations Research
Office
The Johns Hopkins University

Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist
Department of the Air Force

Mr. William Webster
Executive Vice President
New England Electric System

SECRET

SECRET


CONTENTS

	Page
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	iii
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT	1
I. ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION	5
The Present International Situation	5
Dangers	7
Opportunities	9
II. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. ACTION	11
General Principles	11
Achieving and Maintaining Free World Military Security	13
Political Relations with the Free World and the Soviet Orbit	19
Promoting Free World Stability and Growth	23
III. CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS	33
Integration of Programs	33
Obtaining the Support of the American People	33
The Threshold of U.S. Effort	35
ANNEX A: List of Individual Papers	37
ANNEX B: Letter Inviting Panel Participation and Statement of the Objectives of the Panel	38

SECRET

This is an examination of psychological aspects of U.S. strategy. Our panel's concept of psychological strategy is not that of a separate course of action, but of an integral component of all our policies and programs, economic, military, and political, designed to further U.S. security while working for a just peace. The things we say and the things we do inevitably affect the choices made by leaders and peoples throughout the world — those of our enemies, our allies, the uncommitted, and ourselves. Consequently, we have found it important to consider those political, economic, and military programs which influence attitudes and outlooks, both within the Free World and the Soviet orbit.

Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120002-3



FREE WORLD

COMMUNIST BLOC

POPULATION
OF THE WORLD

SELF-GOVERNING BEFORE 1939

SELF-GOVERNING
AFTER 1939

NON-
SELF-

SATELLITES



2.5 BILLION

Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120002-3

SECRET

Highlights of the Report

The world is in a period of revolutionary change manifested by the pressing political, social, and economic expectations of many peoples; of great and accelerating technological progress; and of grave struggle between the free nations and a dedicated Communist enemy.

In the short-term, the Free World military situation is only partially satisfactory; the overall Western economic situation is spotty; though potentially strong, the political and economic situation in many areas, particularly in the underdeveloped regions, is precarious; and Free World military security and psychological unity are generally deteriorating.

Although the focus of this report is psychological, it has not been possible to avoid a good deal of consideration of economic, political, and military policies, and programs that have a strong bearing on attitudes and outlooks within both the Free World and the Soviet orbit. This is because the net impact of all policies and programs is, at least in part, psychological.

In the course of our examination of the problems facing the United States, which are covered at length in our report, there emerges a necessity for:

1. Explaining to the people of the United States the gravity of the world situation, and spelling out what is required to overcome its dangers.

2. Increasing the military budget to provide for the improvement of the air defense of North America, for the establishment of

a satisfactory air defense of Western Europe, and for the development of a greater capability to deter limited war and to deal with it if it occurs.

3. Providing the leadership, on a continuing basis, for Free World political, economic, and cultural common action to achieve dynamic growth, thus eliminating vulnerabilities to Communism.

4. Continually applying pressure on the Soviet bloc to expose the true nature of their intentions and tactics.

EXPLAINING THE SITUATION

Of the dangers confronting the United States in the next decade, two have concerned us particularly:

1. The United States, the only non-Communist power strong enough economically and militarily to provide sustaining leadership for the Free World, may in fact fail to fulfill that responsibility. In that event, Communist expansion by successive local actions may finally force the United States to abandon many of its traditions and ideals in order to survive as a nation.

2. Exploitation by the Soviets of their technological or military superiority, real or apparent, would shatter the cohesion of the Free World and so encircle and isolate the United States that it could probably survive only at the cost of its way of life.

These dangers must be explained clearly, frankly, and forcefully to the American public.

SECRET

FURTHERING THE MILITARY EFFORT

Military security must be assured in order to provide time and opportunity for taking all other necessary action. Hence, the United States must build its military security to a level that provides a considerable margin of safety.

We do not believe that the general order of magnitude of our security programs, now being undertaken, will be adequate to provide the necessary margin of safety. We are convinced that a greater effort must be made to improve the defense of the North American continent against air attack, not only to protect U.S. retaliatory capability but to deter such attack and to give the American people confidence in their chances for survival.

We are also convinced that a satisfactory air defense of Western Europe must be established without delay. The psychological aspect of such defense is as important as its military aspect for, if the United States is to have the full support of its allies, these allies must have confidence in their own survival as well as that of the U.S. We believe that such a defense system can be installed at an acceptable cost.

We strongly urge the development of a capability to deter limited war or to deal with it promptly should it occur. What we recommend is a strong, mobile ready force of appropriate composition, with arrangements for its employment in all likely areas, and designed to apply only the degree of force required to deal with a particular situation.

EXPANDING THE FREE WORLD

To win out in the end over the forces of Communism, the United States must seize the initiative and promote an expanding Free World. We conclude that this is a very long-term measure and should be a

permanent part of United States foreign policy.

We do not conceive of this measure as an economic aid or a technological development program alone. It is a program of meeting the aspirations of the peoples of the world by helping them to plan and implement measures for self-development. Along with know-how and capital must go expressions of Free World principles — by deed and by written and spoken word.

Implementing measures include joint development programs, regional integration of effort, development of young leadership, emphasis on programs of interest to native populations, and supporting information programs.

We hesitate to put a cost estimate on such an effort, but to define its dimensions we agree that the figure of an additional \$2 billion per year for a number of years expresses the approximate magnitude. Anything substantially less would be below the threshold of effort likely to produce results. The Soviets have only recently become very active in this area of effort. From the viewpoint of the overall struggle with Communism, U.S. failure to act decisively in this area might well be considered a withdrawal of troops from a battlefield on which the enemy is deploying new and fresh battalions.

EXPOSING THE SOVIETS

The United States must also step up pressure to expose the true nature of Soviet intentions and the falsity of their doctrine. The Free World must not let itself be deflected by changing Soviet tactics from pursuing its objectives. To do so is to lose by default.

The accomplishment of this program will demand an attitude of faith in the future and of confidence in our nation's strength.

SECRET

SECRET

It will also be tedious and exacting and will require personal dedication and sacrifice, but it will not be too demanding of the great resources of the United States. The reward will be the establishment of a strong Free World with the United States the respected first among equals. The alternative

is an encircled and isolated position in which the United States might survive only at the cost of its way of life. It is up to this nation to determine the course of world policy, and live up to the measure of its greatness. Only thus can a just and lasting peace be achieved.

SECRET

The Soviet Union is likely to continue its current tactics for some time. These can be expected to include:

A systematic effort by the Soviets to portray their purposes to the Free World and to their own people as peaceful.

A sustained effort to present Soviet society as "progressive."

A reduction in the element of overt threat in Soviet dealings with the external world.

A major increase in the Soviet effort to establish closer relations with foreign nations by diplomacy and economic and cultural projects, particularly in the underdeveloped regions.

A continuing effort to portray the security ties between the United States and other nations of the Free World as unnecessary, contrary to their own interest, and ultimately dangerous.

Soviet relaxation in one area may have the purpose of removing the base for U.S. action in another. In any event the relaxation of military pressure will enable the U.S.S.R. to step up its diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures. The following developments can therefore be expected:

Increasing support will be given by the Soviet Union to various "national independence movements."

Aggressive moves by Soviet "proxies" may be encouraged.

The technological and military growth of Soviet power will be continued and, perhaps, accelerated, and major efforts, including demonstration of power, will be made to keep the world aware of the Soviet capability for destruction.

In areas such as Western Europe, where the Soviets have small hope of winning outright control, Communist and crypto-Communist parties will make major efforts to interfere with legislative work

in order to undermine security and prevent reform, and will concentrate on "anti-American" propaganda, especially in countries with U.S. bases.

As overt Soviet pressure recedes, the traditional frictions of international relations — such as French distrust of Germany and the Arab-Israeli problem — will come to the forefront. Communism, operating either openly from Moscow and Peking or covertly through local Communist parties, will exploit these strains and schisms. This exploitation can be entirely ruthless and divorced from ideological considerations, for whichever side Communism chooses to support (and frequently it will support both) the Free World can only lose.

The Soviet Union is very unlikely to choose general war as a policy course at this time unless Free World military power is outpaced technologically or dwindles to a level where the Soviet Union has a high possibility of achieving quick success without major damage to itself.

There is evidence, moreover, that the U.S.S.R. and its satellites are experiencing tensions and strains in certain areas. It is undoubtedly becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the centralization of authority and direction of the Soviet system in the face of an expanding population, urbanization, the growing economy, and increased though unbalanced industrialization. There are also the continuing problems of production and control in the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy, and above all, of raising the standard of living of the Soviet peoples, whose expectations have been growing.

The variations in the complex relationships around Russia's periphery are manifold, as are the relationships and problems connected with national Communist parties. Furthermore, many of these contacts

SECRET

SECRET

are complicated by the problems which surround ethnic minority and nationality groups within the Soviet Union and in the satellites.

The composition of leadership groups of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites is undergoing transformation. New leaders are emerging who require a new rationale suitable for solving conflicts between internal and external policies.

We have been shown no evidence, however, that the Soviet system is likely to experience critical difficulties from any arms competition in which it feels it must engage. The highest peacetime level of U.S. defensive effort that can be expected at present is not high enough to bring about an economic crisis within the U.S.S.R.

Soviet policies seem to be formulated by a group in which presumably several points of view are represented. It appears that present Soviet strategy is more or less open-ended and therefore liable to sudden change, either in the direction of increasing aggressiveness, possibly to the point of all-out war, or of a growing readiness to pretend to, or even genuinely to participate in, the stabilization of peace.

DANGERS

Among the dangers that will confront the U.S. in the next decade, two have concerned us particularly:

Failure by the U.S. to fulfill its responsibilities as the Free World's leader will open the way to further Communist expansion by successive local actions, especially in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Our national interest requires a sustained U.S. stewardship over the Free World's cohesion. The U.S. is the only non-Communist power strong enough economically and militarily to assume such a world-wide responsibility. Failure to exercise this leadership would lead to the gradual disintegration of the

Free World's security structure and to the ultimate "encirclement" of the United States, an avowed objective of world Communism. Forced back on its own resources and confronted with an almost unmanageable military situation, an encircled United States might not survive or would be driven for the sake of survival to adopt policies and expedients inconsistent with its traditions and ideals.

Actual military or technological superiority, or the skillful conveying of an impression of such superiority, could be exploited by the Soviets in order to disintegrate the cohesion of the Free World or, for that matter, to weaken the resolution of the United States itself.

This danger could be aggravated by:

1. The loss of positions in the Free World (e.g., in the Middle East).

2. The falling behind in armaments of our major allies, and the growing obsolescence of their military forces.

3. The loss, or restrictions on the use, of U.S. forward bases.

4. Inadequate defense budgets, especially in the U.S., coupled with a continuing failure to coordinate the defense economies of all NATO nations in the most productive manner.

5. Rates and levels of research and development inferior to those of the Soviet Union, coupled with a continuing Soviet capability to exploit Free World scientific resources.

The U.S. policy of alliances has been based on the assumption that peace requires deterrent strength and that such strength includes the willingness to fight if necessary. Deterrent strength is being achieved (a) by the development of nuclear and other military power and (b) by alliances. While nuclear deterrents are an essential and irreplaceable element of U.S. security,

SECRET

the hazards of nuclear warfare are extremely great, especially for densely populated countries close to the Soviet bloc. The Soviets have been very skillful in stimulating "nuclear anxieties," and there is a great danger that some of our allies, as well as the uncommitted powers, will seek to adopt a neutral position. This trend toward neutralism or, conversely, against "nuclear security," will tend to increase unless we are able to explain to our allies:

The military significance of their defense effort.

The peaceful objective of our security strategy.

The fact that the U.S. shares with them the risks of atomic war.

The bad faith of Soviet "ban-the-bomb" agitation.

While our intentions may be dangerously misinterpreted by the Free World, an equally grave danger arises from the misinterpretation of our needs and intentions by the U.S. public. An over-emphasis on peace as the chief goal of policy, particularly if the emphasis involves an incapacity to muster any effective force except nuclear weapons, makes it increasingly difficult to use force or the threat of force to safeguard our interests. This is especially true if the Soviet military challenge takes the form of peripheral, "brush-fire" wars.

The U.S. system of alliances may be further eroded if some of our present partners become convinced that the only way to achieve their primary objectives, or to avoid difficulties, is by making deals with the U.S.S.R. Specifically, the following problems may arise:

1. As time goes on, Western Germany may become increasingly vulnerable to the Soviet diplomatic offensive, not only for reasons that affect all Western Europe but also because Soviet acquiescence is prerequisite to German unity. Repeated Soviet

emphasis on the proposition that German unity can be achieved through abandonment of NATO and through direct negotiations with the East German regime — and by no other means — may have a powerful cumulative effect on German thought and policy.

2. A prolonged reduction in the overt Soviet threat is likely to make Japan less willing to accept full membership in the Free World alliance: first, because the Japanese desire to avoid a serious and sustained armament effort; second, because they look to East-West trade as a possible solution of their chronic trade crisis; and third, because the Free World has not yet found a political role of stature for Japan of at least the magnitude of Western Germany's role in Europe.

3. There are powerful non-Communist elements in many countries that are not immune to the suggestion that their national interest will best be served by a pro-Russian and anti-American orientation. Moreover, colonial as well as balance-of-power interests may temporarily disrupt Free World unity at critical junctures. Such a danger would be increased any time the Soviet Union granted some concession.

Countries of South and Southeast Asia, intent on their domestic problems of economic growth and the modernization of their societies, and obsessed with the memory of their colonial past, have been susceptible to wishful thinking concerning the intention of the Communist bloc. The Soviet diplomatic offensive is likely to intensify the tendency of these countries toward neutralism.

Arab countries in the Middle East, are also likely to become more susceptible to the Soviet diplomatic offensive in order to increase their bargaining power over the West and to gain aid and advantage in the

SECRET

SECRET

conflict with Israel. Many local "nationalist" parties are inclined to cooperate with the Soviets. Except in a few countries, the psychological posture of the U.S. in the Middle East is particularly weak, while the Soviet Union is steadily gaining ground.

In Africa, the problem of colonialism is likely to make a number of areas increasingly vulnerable to Soviet overtures and subversion. Throughout the continent of Africa, this central problem takes a variety of forms that may work to Communist advantage. Relaxation of the cold war will permit the U.S.S.R. to stimulate the development of critical situations on this front, especially in connection with possible complications in South Africa. Acute strains can then be expected in the relations between some of the major countries of the Free World.

In all underdeveloped areas we can expect a systematic Soviet effort to assist with economic problems. In areas where the Soviets succeed in establishing a foothold, their influence will be strengthened by their ability to integrate political and economic considerations and the flexibility of their decision-making machinery.

In summary, by failing to put forward a greater level of effort now, the U.S. will continue to be confronted by a mounting series of crises. These crises will, at the minimum, require increasing levels of cost and effort and, at the maximum, will cost us our very way of life.

OPPORTUNITIES

The opportunities that confront us, if we pursue vigorously the recommended courses of action, are:

We will preserve the American way of life and give leadership, hope, and confidence to the Free World.

The Soviet Union may ultimately be brought to recognize that it has no possibility of achieving a position of strategic superiority over the West. It may then decide that Soviet national interest requires modification of the Communist doctrine of world revolution leading to a transformation of the U.S.S.R. into a normal member of the world community.

Stable, effective democratic societies can be developed in the underdeveloped areas of the world (and in underdeveloped parts of some advanced areas) that will be resistant to subversion and to the appeals of extremist movements.

The NATO community of nations can develop an antidote for neutralism and defeatism through an increased sense of common purpose and of confidence in its own capacity to work toward constructive goals.

Given the proper psychological climate, there exist sufficient resources in the Free World to achieve and maintain arms supremacy in all significant weapons systems and geographical areas.

We have the capacity to raise the odds against Soviet surprise attack by the continuous strengthening of our offensive capabilities and of our defense and warning systems, and thus to reduce Soviet chances for successful attack and hopes to forestall retaliation.


The U.S., especially if aided by the industrial nations in the Free World, has the capacity to stay ahead in the technological race, provided that it makes the required efforts.

The Communist parties in many European countries may become so discredited and demoralized that it should be possible to reduce them gradually as politically significant factors.

SECRET

In the long run, by the dedicated exertion of essential extra effort, money, and energy for the next decade, we will be buying insurance against what would otherwise be successively more threatening crises, which

we will then be able to meet only by disproportionately larger expenditures and possibly sacrifices of our greatest treasure — American lives.



SECRET

Chapter II

Strategic Framework for U. S. Action

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

We are suggesting no new broad components of national security policy in this report; our major recommendation is the need of a longer-range view and a better integration of our policy instruments. The problem of the continually changing situation is not only what to do, but also how and how much to do; not only a problem of initiation and review, but also a problem of management, leadership, and long-term continuity. It is a problem of program balance, timing, coordination, adjustment and emphasis, adapted to a very dynamic situation.

We are faced with the necessity of maintaining three initiatives in the eyes of the world:

1. The initiative in maintaining military power adequate to deter any aggression.
2. The initiative for peace in negotiation.
3. The initiative in furthering the aspirations, material and spiritual, of the people of the world.

The Soviet Union strives to turn our successes in the first of these initiatives into a propaganda liability for us in our struggle to maintain the second and third. The need for taking all three initiatives poses problems unprecedented in our national experience. We must preserve the substance and effect of our deterrent power while proving to the world that we stand for peaceful solutions, cultural progress, and idealism. It is imperative that our intentions and actions in all three fields reinforce one another.

Unifying Concepts

The transformation of NSC decisions into action programs represents the foreign policy area in which greater effectiveness must be achieved. In many ways, it is more difficult to devise adequate programs accommodated to the conflicting limitations of funds, trained manpower, and materiel than to make the policy decisions from which these programs derive. The problem is further complicated by the necessity of ensuring that the programs actually adopted support one another.

The total impact and effectiveness of U.S. psychological strategy depends in considerable part on the adoption of unifying concepts. Certain of these concepts are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The Struggle to Capture the Symbols

In this phase of the cold war, the most crucial contest may well be over the allegiance of the uncommitted part of the world, encompassing approximately a billion people, as well as over the continued cohesion of our allies. Success or failure in this struggle may turn in considerable part on which side captures the symbols that express man's aspirations and thereby influence political behavior. These include peace, self-government, economic advancement, security, freedom and cultural progress. All policy must therefore be examined not only for its substantive but also for its symbolic impact.

SECRET

The Thresholds of Effort and Realization

Committed as our country is to continuing efforts on a global basis, we must give close attention to the resources and actions required to surmount thresholds that mark the minimum levels necessary to effectively implement our policies and programs. A policy without adequate resources to support it may be little better than no policy at all, and the resources expended, instead of leading to partial success, may give little or no return.

Timing

As Communist strategy develops greater maneuverability, we can depend less and less on crash programs to rescue us from crises caused by our failure to develop far-sighted policies and programs. Because the time-tolerance for decision-making has been drastically reduced, we continually pass phase lines warning of the approach of possible hazards which, if not dealt with immediately by forehand action, may later reach a crisis with no alternative open to us but a costly salvage operation, or worse. The contest for Indochina for example, may have been decided before the U.S. took an active interest in the struggle.

Coordination

We realize that this word and concept is worn thin by discussion. We believe, however, that the change in Soviet tactics places a special and very exacting demand on the coordination of the policies and programs of our government. Unless there is a highly effective coordination of our programs and of information about them, our initiatives almost certainly will appear contradictory and incompatible.

Common Action

We have the possibility of demonstrating our principles by actions and thereby creating a sense of Free World community through cooperative efforts. The fact of being engaged in a common effort with Americans may prove psychologically as significant as what is actually being achieved.


We must remember, however, that to arouse local enthusiasm action must be of a character that can appeal to the imagination of the people and must give the impression that a better future is being built. We should avoid embarking on fantastic programs for psychological reasons, but should rather plan our development programs after assessments both of their technical utility and the sense of direction and useful evolution they can impart.

The Posture of Confidence

The effectiveness of our policy depends on the psychological and moral framework created for it. It is to the Soviet interest to project the contest between us and the Soviet bloc as a pure power struggle, from which the rest of the world should stand apart. This is one of the psychological bases of neutralism. Conversely, it is in our interest to convey the true situation, which the Soviet leaders themselves never forget, that the struggle is essentially ideological. We must show that we are not prepared to jeopardize the principles of freedom as the price of peace. Our problem is to inject into our actions the values that oppose the Communist image of matter as the master of the universe. To meet Communism solely as a competing economic or military system is to miss the dimensions of the Communist challenge and to pave the way for

SECRET

SECRET



its expansion under the guise of the values of freedom, human dignity, and peace:

"The central fact of today's life is the existence in the world of two great phil-

osophies of man and of government. They are in contest for the friendship, loyalty, and support of the world's peoples.

"On the one side, our nation is ranged with those who seek attainment of human goals through a government of laws administered by men. Those laws are rooted in moral law reflecting a religious faith that man is created in the image of God and that the energy of the free individual is the most dynamic force in human affairs."

(Address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association in Philadelphia, Wednesday, August 24, 1955).

It is therefore important that the U.S. express its policies so that the following basic principles are recognizable as their foundation:

1. Well-being and military security are complementary and indivisible.
2. The problems confronting the countries of the Free World are soluble by peaceful evolutionary means.
3. Communism is obsolete.
4. Because of its traditions and ideals, the U.S., not the U.S.S.R., is the natural leader in the current period of revolution and in the struggle for a lasting peace.

ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING FREE WORLD MILITARY SECURITY

The initiative the U.S. must maintain in the field of military security supplies the basis for initiative in negotiation and in the promotion of Free World stability. Subtlety of diplomacy will not be able to hold the Free World together if our allies lose confidence in our ability to deter aggression or to protect them in case of war. A development program to increase Free World sta-

bility will be futile if the uncommitted nations become convinced that communism has the capacity to submerge them. Thus our military posture has a psychological component that we can ignore only at our peril.

Moreover, nuclear power, the rapid rate of technological advance, and the cost of production and manufacture of modern

SECRET

arms have changed the pattern of international affairs. The consciousness of the existence of the nuclear threat may contribute to restraint in certain situations but it may also encourage an adventurous policy through the belief that only the defense of a very vital interest will cause a power to unleash a nuclear war. The international situation is further complicated by the likelihood that small nations may come to possess some nuclear weapons capability.

The rate of technological advance has brought with it a rapid rate of obsolescence of weapons systems together with greatly increased complexities of manufacture. Some weapons systems are now obsolescent before they are operational. One consequence is that most nations lack the industrial capacity to keep up with changes in the armament technology. Put another way, responsibility for the progress of military development and for the supply of modern arms now rests with only a few powers.

The U.S. military security program is designed to (1) deter aggression of all types, (2) win in case of limited war and survive to win in case of general nuclear war, and (3) support the psychological and political arms of policy.

United States Military Strength

Armed force is what peoples and statesmen think it is until it is actually tested in operation. Hence choices and actions result from the strategic impression created by the force in being. In order to reduce Soviet options, the United States and its allies should build and maintain sufficient military strength to convey the strategic impressions that (1) we have highly effective

power, both for defense and retaliation, against massive nuclear power either threatened or used, and that (2) we command alternatives to the use of massive atomic weapons if the situation warrants.

We need, in addition to a strong offensive capability: (1) a greater capability for the air defense of Western Europe, (2) a more effective deterrent to limited and peripheral war, and (3) more resources for and greater public emphasis on the defense of our country against massive nuclear attack.

These actions are feasible technically and financially; they can be put forward as non-threatening, non-aggressive measures that will further the President's Geneva program, erase reputation for "warmongering", and gain acceptance as essential prerequisites to initiation of an effective arms inspection program. Moreover, adequate defense should be stressed for psychological reasons. It gives the assurance of confidence in case of crisis, which would not be forthcoming under current programs. Coupled with a quiet and strong nuclear offensive readiness, it seems likely to be more rewarding than reliance primarily on massive nuclear offense.

Limited War Capabilities and Deterrents

Massive nuclear power alone seems unlikely to provide an effective deterrent to limited peripheral or "brush-fire" wars. Attempts to use such power as the sole deterrent would tend more likely to be a psychological and political liability, which might threaten the unity of our alliances and of our efforts to achieve acceptance of our policies by neutrals. Today our allies feel we have only two alternatives: (1) primary dependence on massive nuclear power and (2) doing nothing effective.

SECRET

SECRET

Hence our coalition policy finds itself in difficulties. The price of keeping our allies includes, in addition to our present capabilities, the creation of a mobile force of adequate size capable of acting quickly with or without the use of tactical atomic weapons in situations short of general war. We should, therefore, depend for a deterrent to limited war on (1) a ready mobile force, (2) political arrangements facilitating quick employment—preferably in collaboration with indigenous forces, and (3) obscurity concerning our atomic intentions. In this manner we would achieve a dual deterrent to limited war; first, the ready mobile force and, second, the possibility that, if necessary, our full atomic power will be brought to bear.

We recognize the psychological and political value of collective action in case the need for the use of force arises. It is, however, the course of wisdom to maintain a considerable degree of "free hand" through arrangements that will, in case of need, permit the U.S. to take the needed initiative in time for the action to be effective. The rapid action in Korea can serve as a precedent. The hazards of the future are exemplified by a possible crisis situation in the Middle East, where any action to be effective might need to be taken rapidly. The number and magnitude of lesser tensions of the Middle East type may well increase and the fear that action to deal with a local issue might lead to general nuclear war may make it increasingly difficult for us to meet such crises.

NATO and the Air Defense of Western Europe

The position of NATO, and our role in it has been vitally important. This position has been achieved in great part through the psychological effect of the confidence and the feeling of unity engendered by the cooperative building of military

force. Even though the extent of that force in being at any time has been of questionable adequacy, or of obvious inadequacy, the needed security effect has been achieved. Like the weapons system on which it was based, this program has now become somewhat obsolescent and has to develop a new integrating component. That needed component is the psychological impact of an air defense program for NATO, a program obtainable at an acceptable price. There will, of course, come a day when the means provided will be, at least in part, obsolescent, although many will lend themselves to conversion to the more advanced requirements. They will, however, in the meantime provide a large measure of military security while giving badly needed confidence, impetus, and cohesion to NATO. The price of inaction on this program may be very high—considerably higher than the cost of action. An air defense program for NATO, moreover, would give an incentive to neutral nations, like Sweden, to integrate their military planning with that of NATO. Finally, air defense represents the military sector which can be strengthened without impairing the U.S. peace initiative.

Allies

Our arms assistance programs need an incisive review with particular emphasis on their psychological, political and economic aspects. It appears that (1) we are overextended on promises compared to our current Congressional and Bureau of the Budget policy intentions, and (2) we have not given adequate weight to the impact on weak economies of some programmed military establishments. Adverse results seem certain from the inevitable disillusionment of some governments over the failure of plans worked out with local U.S. military missions.

In Turkey we are already reaping some of the harmful effects of inadequate long-

SECRET

range planning. Our group has the view that we should aim for adequate internal security forces plus only those additional forces which can be supported by the indigenous economy, bolstered by the U.S. assistance we are willing to provide over a long-term period.

The mutuality of U.S. and allied (particularly European) security interests needs increased emphasis. This emphasis can be successful only if the U.S. program and actions prove persuasive in joint allied military planning and in political and public discussion. It can be persuasive only to the degree that it demonstrates to our allies the military significance of their contribution.

The American people and our leadership, moreover, need to consider our internal policies and actions, particularly in defense matters, with an eye to the need for setting a persuasive example for other peoples and their statesmen.

Our policies and administration need to be geared to move quickly and flexibly as we identify weaknesses in our programs and opportunities for useful action.

Regulation of Armaments

The critical difficulties in this area include the impossibility of accounting completely for nuclear production, and the necessity for a very high degree of technical effectiveness in an inspection program, if dependence is to be placed on inspection. But progress may be possible without prior design and acceptance of a completely effective system. In fact, an effective system can probably not be devised without some trial and experimentation. Any inspection system adds to the deterrent effect since it should decrease the inspected country's estimate of its chances of effecting surprise. We should therefore explain to our public and the world that regulation of armaments and "inspection" is proposed not ex-

clusively for the purpose of reducing arms cost, but for the much more important purpose of reducing probabilities of atomic destruction. Reduction of armaments follows inspection and is likely to be dependent on the developments of the inspection system.

In order to keep the initiative, the U.S. needs to maintain a flow of specific proposals and actions. We hold "war maneuvers" with our own forces and with allies. There seem certain to be psychological assets in a program of "peace maneuvers" by which we actually test out strategies and tactics of inspection — perhaps in collaboration with an ally.

Dynamics of Our Military Problem

Since the opening of the Korean war, the Soviet Union has materially assisted us by frightening us and our allies into the needed security effort. The Soviet Union may now do so to a lesser degree and we must depend not on fear, but on positive motivation and leadership. This problem has three closely related aspects:

1. Our constituted governmental and military organizations, with roles and missions derived from the past, are not necessarily administratively in phase with the modern requirements for security.

2. Protracted leadtimes, the length of time between conception and capability to act, are in considerable part due to legislative, budgetary, and administrative considerations endemic to our political and administrative system. There are reports indicating that the Soviet Union may be more successful than we in devising ways to shorten or eliminate these elements of lead-time. It is questionable that we can afford, in the future, the luxuries of time-consuming administrative action.

3. The problem of balance among forces is a very knotty and controversial one.

SECRET

SECRET

Nevertheless, it requires a continuous effort. There should be an increased use of detached scientific analysis of balance, types and scopes of requirements, and of expenditures. We believe that such analysis would show that the priorities for expenditures have shifted more rapidly than the programs. There also appear to be likely returns from a scientific analysis of the offensive-defensive mix of the Soviet Union and the optimum offensive-defensive mix we should oppose to it. The panel tends to believe that the U.S. may well be more secure by balancing the arms equation with the Soviet Union at a comparatively high level of effort rather than at a low level.

Thresholds of Effort and Levels of Preparedness

The leadtimes in the military field are such that the decisions made today determine vital availabilities 3 to 10 years from now. This point is particularly applicable to research and development. Since military needs can only be estimated approximately and because the Soviet Union shows a capability to surprise us by the rapidity of its advance, we should be sure to provide sufficient military power. In the military field a shortage tends to be comparable to a shortage in length of a bridge span; a small extension may spell the difference between security and disaster. The fundamental decisions on security (political and economic as well as military) must now be made years in advance. Since we cannot estimate with hairline precision, we should provide enough. Security, in short, requires a considerable margin of safety.

Initiative, efficiency, and long-run economy will be furthered by:

1. Elimination of fluctuations in provision of resources, and long-term (3-5 years) assurances of availabilities.
2. Relating adjustments in resources to

the military requirements rather than to internal political considerations such as reducing taxes by means of reduced defense expenditures.

The Price of Safety


The Soviet Union is putting a materially greater proportion of its production into military power than are we, and the ruble buys more in the military field than the equivalent dollars. We are probably allocating on a comparative basis too little to maintain a lead or even parity. It is not always realized that a security policy predicated on the humanly admirable but militarily luxurious concept that the opponent must be allowed to strike the first blow has a price tag attached to it. So far, the U.S. has been unwilling to pay.

There is no question about the existence of a very difficult problem in balancing security on the one hand and economic and internal political considerations on the other. In the absence of firm U.S. leadership, security decisions tend to be made more and more on grounds of short-run economic and political considerations. Our group urges increased efforts to coordinate, on a rational and scientific basis, the U.S. security requirement with U.S. economic and political aspirations.

A constant security effort will involve an increase in our military expenditures. Viewed, however, as a proportion of the rising gross national product of our country, it seems that the cost of security might over the long run remain constant.

The U.S. is by far the wealthiest country in the world, measured both in terms of total production and on a per-capita basis. Its leadership in the fiscal and budget area is certain to be persuasive to many countries looking for guidance as to the extent of their security effort and the degree of danger presented to them by the Soviet Union.

SECRET



SECRET

SECRET

The suggestions in the preceding sections may result in some readjustment in currently programmed expenditures; they involve certain additive programs which probably mean an increase of 10 to 20% in the U.S. security budget. With a produc-

tion currently surging upward, and with the leadership existent in our country, there should be no problem of capability to insure our way of life. We can and must afford to survive.

POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE FREE WORLD AND THE SOVIET ORBIT

The Problem

The U.S.S.R. has been most skillful in utilizing the aspirations of humanity for peace, economic advancement, and human dignity in two ways: (1) by generalized talk about peace, it has given the impression that the outstanding disputes are minor and that the achievement of peace depends largely on a change of tone; (2) by focusing on security problems, such as German rearmament, the U.S.S.R. has fostered illusions that it is threatened and has put the onus for reassuring it on the West.

Both tactics are eminently to the Soviet advantage. As long as the concept of peace is identified with a change of tone alone it will be simple for the U.S.S.R. to use negotiations as part of its peace offensive. The more the Soviet bloc is permitted to capitalize on peaceful gestures which cost it nothing, such as visits of Soviet farm delegations, the more difficult it will prove to get popular support for the level of Free World security expenditure (political and economic, as well as military) without which the Soviet bloc may soon achieve strategic superiority. The more prolonged the discussions about threats to Soviet security, the more difficult will it prove to return to real security problems: the growth of the Soviet orbit, the subversive activities of Communist movements, the aggressive tactics of communism in Asia, the preponderance of Soviet military strength in Eu-

rope, and the danger of a surprise nuclear attack.

When Soviet pressure is relaxed, moreover, the traditional frictions of international affairs tend to come to the forefront. Examples are the French distrust of Germany, the Arab-Israeli problem, frictions among certain states of Latin America. The U.S.S.R. is thereby offered an opportunity to increase our embarrassments at little cost and less risk. This situation is aggravated by the fact that in major areas of the world, where no conception of our power exists, irresponsible governments seem convinced that they can act with impunity toward the U.S. but not toward the U.S.S.R.

In negotiations with the Soviet bloc, the U.S. should base its measures on the following principles:

1. Since in a revolutionary period the contest is over the minds of men, all governmental actions have not only a substantive but also a symbolic significance.

2. Initiative is of cardinal importance. It provides the opportunity for defining the psychological and moral framework of the negotiations; it absorbs the energies of the other side in defensive measures; and it maximizes the possibilities of conflicts within the Soviet leadership group.

3. One means of achieving the initiative is to come to a conference with more than one set of proposals so that the Soviets will

SECRET

be kept off balance and the U.S. can project an impression of imagination and purposefulness to the rest of the world.

4. Negotiations leading to the settlement of issues which leave the Soviet orbit unimpaired play into the hands of the Soviets because (a) they gain time until their strategic situation improves, and (b) each such settlement, however trivial, tends to undermine the resolution of the Free World.

5. In certain situations, such as when negotiations in one area are used to mask aggressive moves in other areas, the threat to break off negotiations or the refusal to continue to negotiate is itself a negotiating weapon.

In summary, the U.S. must devise a policy which (a) maintains sufficient pressure to discourage Soviet adventures, but (b) through tactics which do not undermine the possibilities of an evolution of the Soviet system. Of these lines of action, the need for maintaining pressure is the more fundamental. Whenever policies to promote the evolution of the Soviet system are inconsistent with maintaining pressure they will have to be sacrificed.

The over-all U.S. political problem resolves itself into the following tasks: (1) to maintain within the U.S. domestic support for a continuation of a firm policy; (2) to announce a program which captures the universal desire for peace but still leaves no doubt that peace can only be achieved through a series of concrete adjustments; (3) to conduct negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on a plane where the presence of Soviet troops in the center of the continent, the Soviet satellite orbit, and aggressive Soviet tactics in Asia are stressed as the causes of the present tension; (4) to devise a policy for dealing with Soviet efforts to use the relaxation of tensions to foment rivalries within the Free World.

Exploitation of the Position Established by the President at Geneva

The effectiveness of these measures will depend on the psychological framework created for them. No one is in a better position to achieve the maximum psychological impact than the President, building on the position he established at Geneva. No one could better rally the American people and make clear to them that conciliation stands at the end, not at the beginning of negotiations.

As soon as his health permits, the President might consider a speech to the nation explaining that a real relaxation of tensions is impossible without Soviet concessions on issues which caused the tension in the first place, such as the division of Germany, the enslavement of the satellites, etc.; that while the U.S. is willing to negotiate as long as there exists a hope for concrete results, it will not be a party to misleading the people of the world if the negotiations should merely mask continued Soviet intransigence.

In order to put the Soviets on the defensive, the President might also deem it appropriate to reiterate and expand the philosophy which prompted him to present his "open sky" proposal at Geneva. Opportunity for such a statement may be provided by a full-length reply to Bulganin's disarmament letter. In his answer, the President might press the Soviets toward more rapid progress in accepting an inspection scheme and he might propose that, in the interim, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should pledge themselves to see to it that the U.N. Charter henceforth will be complied with more faithfully.

Negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

Within the psychological framework thus created by the President, we can counteract the Soviet strategy of pressing issues where

SECRET

SECRET

we are at a maximum disadvantage while using the relaxation of tensions to maintain the status quo in other areas by the following measures:

1. Developing specific proposals aimed at forcing the Soviets to make concrete readjustments in our strategic favor.

2. Making clear at every stage of the negotiations the outstanding issues still to be settled and pressing for them. An example might be a conference of the signatories of the Korean Armistice to discuss violations of the armistice agreement and to implement its provisions for free elections.

3. Better utilizing our influence in international organizations to prevent the Soviet bloc from exploiting them for their own ends and to put the Soviets on the defensive. In particular, we should: (1) prevent a repetition of the Algerian vote in the UN through fuller consultation with our friends, such as the Latin American bloc; (2) keep the Soviet bloc on the defensive by exploiting its vulnerabilities, such as the slave labor system.

We can prevent the U.S.S.R. from eroding the unity of the Free World by the following kinds of measures:

1. Relation of single issues, such as elections for Vietnam, to similar problems in other areas where our position is stronger. There may be wisdom in insisting, in advance of any crisis, that the problem of free elections in one divided country should not be separated from the problem of free elections in all countries presently divided. With this approach, we could demand that free elections, under suitable guarantees go forward in Korea and Germany, and when appropriate, in Vietnam.

2. In Europe, Germany is the issue where Western moral, military, and legal positions are most in harmony. Now that the West's proposal for full political unification has been rejected, the U.S. confronts the prob-

lem of shifting the onus for the continued partition of Germany on the U.S.S.R. and of demonstrating that the alternative plan proposed by Molotov and the East German regime is a sham. We can do this by concentrating our fire on the weakest Soviet point — their refusal to accept free election. We should propose a series of limited steps toward unification, such as an Economic Parliament or an Advisory Parliament based on free elections, which will demonstrate that it is the Russian refusal to accept free elections and not German participation in NATO which is the obstacle to German unification.

We should also attempt to associate major segments of West German opinion with our policy to assure continuation of pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. One means to achieve this would be frequent invitations to German parliamentary and public opinion leaders from all democratic parties to conferences and consultations with their American counterparts both in Germany and in the U.S.

We should deal with Soviet efforts to use the relaxation of tensions in order to foment difficulties in critical areas by the following kinds of measures:

1. A warning to the U.S.S.R. — perhaps contained in the Presidential address recommended above — that peaceful coexistence is seriously prejudiced by Soviet actions which can only lead to increased tensions and the danger of violence.

2. A program, also discussed later in this chapter, to reverse the trend of events in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Such a program should have as its guiding principle that anticipatory, farsighted action may prevent a crisis from occurring at all. The U.S. should keep in mind, however, the harmful psychological impact of making concessions whenever a nation flirts with the Soviet bloc.

SECRET

3. A demonstration that the U.S. understands its strategic interests and intends to defend them. The U.S. should find a concept for the twentieth-century equivalent of "showing the flag" by a combination of military, political and economic power.

4. Coordination of our policies with those of other nations which have major interests in the area in question. In the Middle East a systematic effort should be made to develop the closest coordination between the U.S. and U.K. positions. Such a policy presupposes submerging commercial and other rivalries in our overriding objective of preventing communism from turning our flank in the Middle East. A joint U.S.-U.K.-Egyptian development program of the Nile might have given us the political leverage to forestall the Soviet arms deal.

5. Contacts with the West are bound to affect the Soviet Union and its satellites. These contacts might influence the Soviets slowly along a road on which it is difficult but (and we emphasize) not impossible, to turn back. With the understanding that there is no certainty of improvement but only a possibility, we recommend: (1) that we should press all contacts with the Soviet Union that do not hazard important values; (2) that racial and family relationships across the Iron Curtain might well be a very fruitful area for greater development. While the peoples of the U.S.S.R. have been under Communist domination nearly 40 years and in virtual cultural isolation for most of their history, the peoples of the European satellites have been under Soviet domination only 10 years. Hence, there is much more probability for a maximum impact on the satellites than on the Soviet Union; (3) that American participants in exchange programs and American visitors to Russia be carefully briefed about Soviet methods of influencing foreigners and exploiting them for propaganda purposes.

Colonialism

Many of the difficulties confronting the U.S. with regard to the colonialism issue are psychological in origin. The American position is made difficult by the American national conviction that "colonialism" is bad under all circumstances and that "national independence," whatever that may mean in a concrete case, is admirable. This conviction overlooks the fact that many peoples are incapable of self-government, that the nationality principle is not applicable in areas where many religions, cultures, and races mingle and where a "nation" may emerge only in the future. It also forgets the millions of white people who have settled in the colonial areas for more than 100 years and whose rights deserve respect and protection.

The image the U.S. projects regarding its attitudes toward colonialism will influence our effectiveness in dealing with this issue. Bearing this in mind, the U.S. should adopt a policy inspired by the following general considerations:

1. The U.S. utilizing developmental and information programs and assisted by the community of free nations will make every effort to satisfy the aspirations of the colonial peoples.

2. The political solutions to the many outstanding colonial situations will be responsive to local requirements.

3. In case of unrest, the U.S. will exert its influence so that repressive actions by colonial powers will be as indirect as possible.

4. Trusteeship by more advanced civilizations is an essential moral obligation wherever the populations are incapable of organizing themselves into a state and assuming their place in the community of nations; where divisions in the population would allow some other advanced community, including a Communist force, to exploit a

SECRET

22

SECRET

native population; and where the survival interests of large numbers of peoples are at stake.

5. Soviet spokesmen will not be allowed to attack Western "colonialism" (for example, in the UN) without being reminded forcefully not only about their own colonial possessions, but also about the fact that these possessions are hidden away behind an impenetrable Iron Curtain.

The Relations Between Diplomacy and Psychological Strategy

The things we say, which are "policy," and the things we do, which are "programs" need to be consistent and mutually supporting. The psychological and political

aims of national policy depend on the support of economic or military programs of action. Conversely, the effectiveness of these programs depends greatly on the timing, choice, and other characteristics of the manner in which we explain them. In particular, we must strive to get the greatest psychological benefit from our actions and weigh substantive advantages against possible psychological disadvantages. For example: we should not take unilateral actions without attempting to sell them for political and psychological benefits. Just as the Soviets used their relinquishing of a Finnish base as a move in the cold war, so we should seek to derive political benefits from such gestures as the withdrawal of U.S. divisions from Korea.

PROMOTING FREE WORLD STABILITY AND GROWTH

Emerging Prospects

Soviet tactics for the emerging phase of the struggle will continue to work toward the long-term objective of capturing the Eurasian-African land-mass piecemeal and by means short of a general war. There is growing evidence that the U.S.S.R. has realized that its most effective means of expansion is by identifying itself with the concern of a large part of the world for internal political, economic, and social growth. We can anticipate that Soviet expansion through economic development will become a permanent phase of the struggle.

We need, therefore, to counter this program on a broad basis and in a way that does not involve us continually in the costs and losses incident to open crises. Understandably, over the last decade, we have concentrated our efforts to a considerable extent on political and military programs and have created some belief that our economic, social, and cultural programs are

sporadic and temporary. There is, moreover, a tendency within the U.S. to brand such programs as "do-goodism," and the trend appears to be toward the reduction of these programs at the earliest possible date.

Our group believes that we should initiate a long-range program to assist Free World development aimed at assisting societies toward peaceful change and growth and toward meeting the aspirations of peoples. Whenever effective and appropriate, this should be done through the UN. A society that is economically viable and democratic in the sense that power, initiative, responsibility, and opportunity for advancement are widely distributed will give Communism fewer opportunities to seize power except by overt external aggression. The latter is the easiest form of aggression to combat. In development programs we should consider not only their technical utility but the sense of direction and useful

SECRET

evolution they can impart. It is therefore important:

1. That the U.S. undertake a systematic study, by area, of the kind of program which will be most suitable for enlisting the interest of the population.

2. To devise means for dramatizing the impact of these programs.

Leadership and Confidence in Progress


Any long-term program to promote Free World stability must have as one of its major targets the small group of intellectuals, administrators, and technicians who provide the leadership in all areas and whose influence is particularly strong in the former colonial areas of Asia and the Middle East. Communism owes much of its success because of inroads among this group. A program of leadership training — particularly for young leaders — may not yield startling results in the short run. Nevertheless, we should aim to strengthen the leadership resource base, to keep younger leaders constructively employed

or in training. We should seek, with the cooperation of government and business authorities, expansion of opportunities for employing young leaders so that they may gain a personal stake in their society.

An important method in selecting and rewarding leadership lies in defining standards of excellence. One of the difficulties of the Free World is its problem in matching the dedication of the Communist orbit with a similar dedication of its own. This reflects a crisis of values brought about in part by a destructive Communist critique, in part by their superior ability to symbolize their values. We should, therefore, create a system of awards which define and reward excellence in interpreting and furthering the basic values of the Free World similar to what the Nobel Prize does for the advancement of peace and the Stalin prize for achievements in the Communist realm.

Any society must in the long run acquire the resources, particularly the economic ones, to move forward in pace with its desire for progress. This requirement is part

BASIC ELEMENTS for a program of Free World dynamic growth



SECRET

SECRET

of an equally compelling requirement that individuals, communities, and states must develop confidence in their ability to make progress. Uncertainty, lack of confidence, and frustration make for instability. We should not bind ourselves to the effectiveness of the Communist campaign against sorely-pressed, moderate leadership in some newly-independent countries. Lacking the means to fulfill the promises of "independence", these leaders are vulnerable to the Communist charge that they are bankrupt. They are thus unable to counter effectively the Communist formula for achieving popular aspirations.

In order that the democratic way may survive, the aspirations of all classes and regions in each nation's society have to receive consideration. This is a particular problem in countries with substantial urban populations. The economic gap between rural and city people can become critical with rising industrialization.

In many areas we are widely regarded, with some justice, as having been too exclusively preoccupied with high-level diplomatic negotiation, with pacts, treaties, and conferences about global issues that have little relevance or appeal to the people or their local leadership. Foreign grass-root support for U.S. policies can be obtained only if people at the grass roots understand our endeavors and benefit from them.

The Threshold of Economic Effort Required

We believe that a minimum level of effort is required and that we have not achieved it. We are spending substantial amounts on economic aid, but the bulk is for short-term relief and rehabilitation in crisis areas like Korea and Vietnam. We believe between one and two billion dollars per year, in addition to current aid and capital investment, needs to be made available for underdeveloped areas capable of using addi-

tional resources productively under realistic criteria of eligibility. We believe, moreover, that this rate of investment must be maintained over a number of years if sustained results are to be achieved. The hope in such a program is that by reinforcing the promise of success in countries such as Turkey, India, Burma, and the Latin American states and by stimulating new efforts in countries not yet in motion we can prevent the development of economic and political crises that would be many times more costly to meet.


We should keep in mind that the Soviet Union can match us if we set our activity at a low level and encumber our programs with lengthy administrative leadtimes. We can outstrip communism and give leadership to the world only by setting our effort at an effective level and by projecting the initiative, imagination, vision, and willingness to take risks that have traditionally characterized U.S. private enterprise. We must accept the fact that the struggle with communism is almost certain to go on over a long period. We see economic development as inseparable from political and social development within a country. And so long as a considerable component of military force is required within a country, it must be developed and handled in close relationship with other forms of development.

Expanding the Non-Military Function of NATO

In devising a dynamic program to increase the cohesiveness of the Free World, particular attention should be given to the NATO bloc. Such a program must have two components:

1. A level of military strength that affords a reasonable deterrent against Soviet attack and reasonable protection should it occur.
2. A program of common action to develop a greater sense of community.

SECRET



The program of common action should include an effort to strengthen the non-military functions of NATO. Four ways are suggested in which this might be done:

1. Development of joint studies, through the establishment of research institutes,

2. Joint ventures including, among others, a NATO-wide "ownership" program, a NATO cultural program, and NATO youth programs,

3. A series of NATO-wide activities designed to encourage mutual adaptation, such as rotating visits of all parliamentarians among the NATO countries including the U.S.

4. Establishment of NATO reporting organs, such as a NATO Parliamentary Gazette.

The question of which of these activities, many of them now carried on by other European bodies to some degree, are appropriate for NATO needs further examination. But the principle of cooperative effort in non-military matters in an organization in which there is U.S. participation seems to us one which follows from the general considerations outlined earlier.

Japan

In Asia, Japan presents us with perhaps our most complicated problem, which illustrates very well the difficulty of the selection and integration of programs. Attention tends to be focused on Japan's economic problem. Our country has to give serious consideration to relaxation of the controls on Japanese trade with the Soviet bloc, if only to provide a convincing demonstration that the solution of Japanese economic problems is not to be found in that direction. An acceleration of growth in the underdeveloped areas, coupled with assistance on our part in directing Japanese trade with these areas, should produce expanding mar-

SECRET

SECRET

kets and sources of raw materials. Continuing favorable adjustment of our tariffs will assist Japan in her difficult economic situation; nor is there any doubt that we must continue to give Japan material assistance for some time if it is to take over responsibility for its own local security.

But Japan will not become an effective partner unless Japanese spiritual and political factors develop in a way that keeps Japan firmly attached as a member of our community of states. This requires that Japan be given a position of honor and respect among nations and that we help Japan become strong and stable. Unless we are successful in this effort there is danger that Japanese opposition to continued alliance with the Free World will increase to a degree damaging to our interests.

The Colonial Question

One of the great threats to the cohesion of the Free World centers in the relation between the industrialized nations and the recently independent countries and colonial areas of Asia and Africa. The image which the U.S. projects toward this relationship will greatly affect the success of the programs we might pursue toward the colonial areas.

As stated earlier in this report U.S. programs toward the colonial areas should rest on two cardinal principles:

1. The community of free nations will make every effort to assist the orderly effort of colonial peoples to satisfy their aspirations.
2. The solutions to the many outstanding colonial problems will be responsive to local requirements.

Our main endeavor should be to promote the peaceful evolution of colonial areas so as to reduce the chances of violent outbreaks. In addition to selected economic

assistance programs, the following long-range steps should be taken:

1. The establishment of joint study groups to elaborate various reform plans.
2. The establishment of school systems with improved curricula including adult education.
3. The development, by the interested Western powers, of an effective intelligence system to isolate troublemakers at an early time.
4. Various efforts to manipulate or split independence movements coupled with the full-fledged cooperation of their moderate wings.
5. In the colonial areas, nations other than the "motherlands" should be allowed to invest, to trade, to advise, and to educate. Personnel exchanges should be multi-lateral, with the native elite going not only to Paris and London, but also to Washington. In order to profit from Western civilization in its broader aspects, the native nationals should be encouraged to maintain all kinds of relationships with various Western nations.

If, in spite of our efforts to prevent it, violence should break out in colonial areas, the U.S. should take a strong stand against atrocities, and a stand for any constructive effort to re-establish peace.

Neutralism

Many countries throughout the world prefer to stand apart from the conflict between the Communist orbit and the West. Some of these countries are new to self-government; most of them are more concerned with anti-colonialism or economic development than with communism.

Our group suggests that the currently developing world situation may make un-

SECRET

wise some policies and programs that require countries to stand up and be counted in the East-West conflict. There are many problems of mutual interest between ourselves and the neutral nations that do not involve the East-West conflict. A neutralism of the Swiss type, based on strength, should be respected and even perhaps encouraged in certain areas in the Middle East and along the rimland of Asia.

The countries inclined to neutralism must have a reason if they are to choose sides at all. In fact, since they are bound to come under Communist pressure, they will need to have adequate reasons to prevent them from being "neutral" against the U.S. It is suggested that one of the long-run counters to this tendency is that the U.S., without direct reference to communism, identify itself on a selective basis with efforts to improve the internal security and the internal economic growth of these neutralist countries.

Military Assistance Programs

Although seemingly designed for a purely military purpose, military assistance programs are also economic assistance programs of a specialized type. They are political and psychological instruments of the greatest delicacy and importance. In the marginally committed and uncommitted nations, they offer a useful instrument for simultaneously establishing internal security and for furthering the aspirations of people for a better life. By using military assistance programs in support of day-to-day policy, we increase the value of military force as a political instrument.

Our military training and assistance country missions have been among our most effective political and psychological instruments in some countries, particularly Latin America. The importance of the military and of military men in the gov-

ernments of new and/or unstable countries is one of the important facts of international life. We can often best maintain contacts and exercise influence through military channels. Military programs, moreover, reach village-level people and their problems.

Atomic Competition

The U.S. now faces two related developments of such a high probability that it needs to prepare a policy against them as if they were certainties. The Soviet Union is now both ready and willing for political purposes to: (a) supply arms to many discontented nations in the Free World, and; (b) compete strongly in international trade and in development programs requiring the provision of capital and technological assistance of many kinds, including atomic energy.

Our country can expect that the Soviet Union will move in every time we offer an opportunity through a mistake, through procrastination, or a half-hearted policy. We can, for example, expect the stiffest kind of competition for the future title to the Atoms-for-Peace program.

Properly exploited, U.S. leadership in extending the peaceful uses of atomic energy has great political and propaganda value, but the U.S. will have to move swiftly to retain the leadership.

It became clear at the 1955 Geneva Atomic Conference that we have few remaining advantages to gain from rigid security and that others, including the Russians, the British, and the French, will soon be in a position to move vigorously into the field. The psychological effects of a more open U.S. atomic information policy can be considerable, especially if we avoid appearing a grudging contributor to foreign programs. It is important to speed declassification of all information in this area except

SECRET

SECRET

data with direct and important military significance.

Three fields of information should be emphasized:

Power — While making data available, we should avoid overselling atomic power for its own sake. Nuclear power plants should be integrated into over-all power programs. While atomic power may soon be competitive in some presently high-cost areas (Japan, Brazil), conventional fuels will pay their own way in many areas for decades to come.

Research — This is an important area for increased cooperation with other nations. It has great symbolic value even before practical results emerge. The present research reactor program is valuable in this light, and could profitably be expanded.

Isotopes — Although applications of isotopes in medicine, agriculture, and industry are of more immediate value to the U.S. than to most areas abroad, the U.S. can benefit psychologically by exporting some of these techniques.

The expansion of knowledge concerning atomic energy may increase the interest of many countries in an inspection and regulation system for nuclear power. Our group has not explored this avenue at length, but suggests that such an exploration might prove rewarding from the political and psychological standpoints.

Removing Trade Restrictions

While we believe the major new emphasis called for in a program for Free World growth and stability is a concentration on the internal problems of countries and regions, we would emphasize that this must be accompanied by redoubled efforts to promote international trade and liberate it from restrictions:

Lower U.S. tariffs would give assistance to the balance of payments position of

Western Europe and Japan. They would also have a salutary or good psychological effect by setting an example for countries tempted to choose autarky.

East-West Trade

Our East-West trade policies were necessary when instituted, and contributed initially to furtherance of our objectives. Most of our allies believe they no longer serve any significant security purpose. In their present form, they may give us more liabilities in the form of strain on Free World unity than they give us assets in the security area.

There are reasons to believe: (1) that the exchange of goods that would actually develop in the absence of any controls would be very much less than our allies believe; (on this score the experience of Sweden is illuminating) and (2) that the strategic value to the bloc of this slight expansion of trade would not be such as to increase significantly their economic war potential. Recent steps to modify East-West trade restrictions help meet pressure from our allies to relax controls. As long as we are aware of the political uses the Soviets might make of trade, the symbolic advantages to be gained from a bold move to call the Soviet bluff by encouraging trade in all but narrowly military significant items, may outweigh the limited strategic advantages of continued restriction.

Furthering Our Interests Through Information

Our information program can be effective only to the degree it is related to our political, economic, and military programs, on which it is completely dependent. Our information effort should be based on the maximum coordination of timing and scope of actions of other programs with the information program. The problem is to have actions that speak both loudly and well in

SECRET

our interest, and then to have an information program which distills the last iota of possible returns from them.

The best information program concerning America abroad would be one expressed on a basis of spontaneity by members of our various missions and by Americans traveling abroad, avoiding the taint often associated with the word propaganda. It is important that this program appeal to intellectuals who supply so much of the leadership, particularly in backward countries. Individual Americans serving our country abroad need to be capable of dealing face-to-face with local leadership groups both on a technical and ideological plane. American personnel abroad should be encouraged to develop the widest possible contacts in the countries in which they are resident...

Current practices inhibit some Americans from seeking or even accepting contacts with persons in foreign countries who are not already reliably known to be our firm friends. This practice, where it exists, should be changed. In fact, it is to our advantage to seek out leadership which is skeptical or even unfriendly, bring it to the U.S., or expose it to information about America and Americans in other ways.

With education and literacy growing at an astounding pace everywhere, books, papers, and magazines provide the most effective way of reaching large numbers of people. Our foreign library program is admirable and should be expanded, but the great need is for really cheap books and magazines of the right types that would be available in local commercial establishments. Unfortunately the Communists have realized this and have flooded areas in which they are interested with masses of literature at heavily subsidized prices. Western writings are too highly priced and available only to the wealthier urban classes. The communicable products of

Western culture which have achieved a really wide audience are comic books and the more sensational films — perhaps it would be possible to institute a program of such items of a helpful type. We recommend a program, substantially financed if necessary, for the subsidization of inexpensive editions in local languages of a wide variety of books, many of which, in order to achieve real impact, will have to be written by authors knowledgeable in the approach here suggested. In addition we should capitalize on the fact that English is a lingua franca in many formerly colonial areas by making available cheap books in English.

Information and Political Warfare

The struggle for men's minds is a total effort in which all aspects of U.S. programs must be coordinated if we are to compete successfully with the highly organized Communist agitation-propaganda "machine."


A specific problem we face is that the Communist movement will endeavor increasingly to win power in underdeveloped areas by exploiting the democratic electoral process. They are already achieving success with unsophisticated electorates through superior organization and large expenditures of men and money. This growing and very acute danger necessitates an intense effort on our part to become more knowledgeable in the field of political warfare and more capable of successfully conducting such activities. A mutual program of fact-finding and training in democratic election procedures would help to insulate newly independent areas against this Communist strategy.

In its preoccupation with "public relations" programs, the United States in the past has been able to overcome many short-range propaganda threats with a remark-

SECRET

SECRET

STRUGGLE FOR MEN'S MINDS - FREE WORLD EFFORT MUST OVERCOME A VAST AGITPROP MACHINE



able measure of success. In so doing, however, it has neglected the long-range dangers and opportunities. Advance knowledge of the processes of attitude formation and of opinion trends abroad has become essential and henceforth must supplement efforts

dealing with the more transitory aspects of opinions. U.S. information programs should continue to concern themselves with laying the foundations of political thinking in addition to reporting and commenting on political developments.

SECRET

The Tone and Scope of a U.S. Information Program

We believe that the "Eisenhower Approach" can positively advance U.S. objectives if we can project its true nature correctly. It is therefore imperative that a very sharp distinction be made between Soviet and U.S. objectives.

The essence of the "Eisenhower approach" is that, while international problems remain unsolved, the United States and other countries should make efforts to solve them in a positive and peaceful fashion, without relaxing our guard and with a clear concept of our strategic goals.

"The spirit of Geneva, if it is to provide a healthy atmosphere for the pursuit of peace, if it is to be genuine and not spurious, must inspire all to a correction of injustices, an observance of human rights and an end to subversion on a world-wide scale. Whether or not such a spirit as this will thrive through the combined intelligence and understanding of men, or will shrivel in the greed and ruthlessness of some, is for the future to tell."

(President Eisenhower's Bar Association Speech)

"The spirit of Geneva" could therefore provide us with a great psychological opportunity:

a. It may give us an opportunity to rally the Free World for a long-term effort by means of a galvanizing new approach.

b. It may, whatever the Soviet's intention, transform deceptive smile offensives into a genuine change.

The effectiveness of these information efforts depends to a large extent on the tone with which we present them. Our tone should be sober, friendly, optimistic, positive, factual, simple, and expository, with emphasis on the need for open-mindedness and for inter-cultural understanding.

Propaganda-to-propaganda responses to Soviet psychological campaigns will not be

as effective as "the propaganda of the deed." The political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions of the U.S. can counteract Soviet propaganda better than can information programs.

U.S. information programs should nonetheless force the Soviets into explicit propaganda lines in order to pin them down tactically and to make sure that Soviet propaganda advantages won by inconsistent behavior in a particular national situation are offset by corresponding Soviet losses in other areas to which the inconsistency would be repelling.

Thus, in colonial areas, the native peoples never should be allowed to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union itself is a colonial power, and that, so far, it has not shown the slightest inclination of giving up its colonial possessions. The state of the Soviet colonies should be made known. Moreover, native peoples should not be left in ignorance about their fate should the Soviets continue to expand. Under no circumstances should Soviet or Communist spokesmen be allowed to attack Western "colonialism" without being reminded about their own colonial possessions.

As in other areas, there is a threshold of effective action in the information field. The whole level of this activity has been too low. The total U.S. effort in the information area should be at least double the present level. Only this would insure that everything possible is being done to make available everywhere the ideas that would inspire progress toward a more peaceful world. Only this threshold will permit an increased flow abroad of peoples, ideas, books, magazines, newspapers, films, broadcasts, television, exhibits, cultural presentations, trade-fair exhibitions, sports teams, technical groups, and delegations of all kinds — soldiers in the battle of ideas.

SECRET

SECRET

Chapter III

Conditions Required for Success

INTEGRATION OF PROGRAMS

It is a truism that political, military, economic and information factors all need coordination in an effective foreign program. The degree of coordination now in effect can be stepped up with a "value-per-dollar" probably higher in effective results than is afforded by any other administrative device at our disposal. The world diplomatic front is a screen on which appears the apparent struggle between the Free World and the Communist camp. Behind it the real struggle goes on in the sphere of weapons research, countermeasure capabilities, and the supreme problem of a technological breakthrough. On this confusing battlefield, coordination of scientific, military and diplomatic developments is urgently needed.

Basic to effective program coordination is the problem of assuring properly trained personnel. Coordination bogs down unless officials assigned to carry out policies understand the cross-relationships of their actions. The scope, variety, and complexity of our programs in support of policy require the assignment of individual specialists to the areas of economics, technology, military science, diplomacy, and information. These individuals need to know more about activities outside their particular spheres — they should also be capable generalists. When such individuals are on the cutting edge of programs in foreign areas they must be capable generalists in the nature of the societies with which they are dealing, and in the direction of movement we are trying to promote in those societies. Much more of a career service approach and career train-

ing is needed for the complicated representation and program direction that is required.

Even when we do achieve a measure of integration, we tend often to stop at integration by country. Only in Europe and to some extent in Latin America do we have a formula and method of operation for integration by region. The national boundary lines usually do not satisfactorily define the divisions between our interests. There needs to be regional integration and coordination at a level below Washington. This need has been recognized by the military as a result of its experience in World War II but has not been recognized or accepted generally in other types of programs. The Middle East and Southeast Asia deserve the most serious consideration for this type of integration.

OBTAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

In our democratic system, the ultimate boundary lines defining the dimensions of the possible are set by the American people. Necessary programs, and the reasons for instituting them, are now more complicated than ever before. Hence, those men whose knowledge and judgment are widely respected bear the very sobering responsibility — more serious than at any time since the opening of World War II — of influencing the American people in what they should accept and support.

The American people yearn to get the threats and costs over with and to return to a condition that the more short-sighted

SECRET

would describe as normalcy. But we live in a period which our President has described as an era of perpetual crisis. Our people can understand and accept a long-range strategy for the achievement of our objectives by the maintenance of a consistent, high level of effort and confidence.

We believe that there now is a dangerous gap between what governments know to be true about the present international situation and what people believe on the basis of the limited information available to them. In particular, until the shape and meaning of the technological arms race is explained with clarity and precision, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the Free World's governments to have that degree of popular understanding required for the support of the policies and actions that must be undertaken. The same is true of the Soviet threat. Soviet peace offensives owe their effectiveness at least in part to the fact that few Free World statesmen in authority dare tell people the real hazards facing them. First among these is the danger that a peace which is not reflected in a certain strategic balance must prove short-lived and a disastrous failure.

Within the U.S., it is important to make clear to the people the real nature of the Soviet threat and the extent of the sacrifices required. This will involve not only reiterated pronouncements by high Administration officials, particularly the President, but also a systematic effort to acquaint influential citizen groups with the rationale of our policy. Our effectiveness abroad will depend on the support of an enlightened public opinion at home.

We recognize that no set of policies and programs is going to receive unanimous approval from the many segments of the American community. Our country, its government, its people, its press, its temperament all combine to prevent any unan-

imous, monolithic acceptance of solutions to the problem of survival facing us over the next decade, perhaps over the next generation. In fact, this lack of unanimity is an element of strength since it calls to the attention of the responsible operating agencies the deficiencies that are bound to exist in any series of programs as complicated as those which must be undertaken.

There must, however, be no mistake in the minds of the world, both the Free World and the Communist world, as to the method and direction of our country's policy and as to the sustained resolution of the American people and its leadership.

Looking back over the past decade the American people have been extraordinarily cooperative in a very confusing foreign policy situation. We now face a situation probably more difficult than any in the last decade. Communism under the guise of peace, good will, progress, arms reduction, anti-colonialism — all the appealing concepts symbolic of peace and progress — reaches for an initiative which, if grasped, might be decisive. In order to meet and reverse this challenge both the American people and the American leadership must rise to realize it.

There are two basic negative points to be accepted and explained to our people:

1. We have now to undertake costly long-term efforts without the stimulus of enemy provocation.

2. We have now to develop policies and programs which go beyond meeting the Communist initiative on an item-by-item basis if we are to assure success in our struggle for the world.

Turning to the positive side, we need and have in great part provided to the Free World a leadership and a basis for confidence. Stable long-term motivation has to be a motivation to do something, not merely to prevent something. Only a positive

SECRET

SECRET

basis of motivation can be independent of specific actions by the enemy, and as a corollary, only a positive motivation can provide any basis for the initiative on our part, and for the consequent advantages.

In the past the American people always have supported policies once they understood their meaning. They want to see their government adopt a long-range strategy which will lead to the gradual solution of the world crisis. The three pillars of such a positive strategy are: (1) avoiding war through a position of strength, (2) simultaneously inducing modification in the Soviet system, and (3) combining the security effort with the promotion of greater well-being at home and abroad. This is possible if American military strength assures peace for a long time, perhaps two generations.

THE THRESHOLD OF U.S. EFFORT

Our country faces a tedious and exacting task which calls for patience, understanding, and perseverance. The demands that it places on our great resources, which loom large in absolute terms, are relatively small. Adequate support of this task does not involve privation for the American people — the effort required is nothing to compare with that expended in World War II.

It is of the utmost importance that the American people be brought to realize that there is something that needs to be done, that the task is not difficult, but that it requires a long-term effort.

Our national tendency is toward piecemeal programs in response to specific crisis situations. We tend, moreover, to press for the reduction of our foreign commitments and to change the scope and character from year to year. Such tendencies are now dangerous in the extreme. The future is bound to be so risky that the mini-

mum required cannot be estimated with close accuracy. The course of wisdom is to provide a level of effort which includes a built-in margin of safety.

The outcome of the struggle for the world which will go forward over at least the next ten years, is highly dependent on a U.S. effort which is both sustained and at an adequate level in each of the great areas of international contact and interaction (military, political, economic, and psychological) in which we are engaged. In all of these areas an inadequate program may give the illusion that we are coping with a problem successfully when in fact we may merely be applying a palliative. We cannot stress too much that the withholding of a comparatively small increment of what a total effort should be may bring liabilities and losses measured by many times the amount withheld. On the other hand, the contribution of the extra increment may make the difference between a success and a critical loss. The analogies in every-day life are simple and well known; the extra tenth of a second of speed wins the race, the extra foot on the flood wall means the difference between safety and disaster.

The U.S. is continually passing time markers which indicate points at which programs must be started to meet long-range needs, either probable or certain. As an example, we are already long past that time when we should have undertaken a definitive and energetic program to increase the yearly flow of scientists and engineers.

This example illustrates the point that, in the situation of revolutionary change in the world, we are continually passing milestones indicating hazards in the future — hazards for which these markers flag the last opportunity to anticipate and prepare.

The level of effort and sustained application of the American people is primarily

SECRET

dependent not on our economic resources (for those seem altogether adequate to the effort required), but on the level of comprehension of the American people. It is the primary task of American leadership to lift this level of comprehension above that minimum threshold which marks the assured adequacy of effort and assured versatility and freedom of action in international affairs.

If the United States confines itself to its present level of national effort, the somber prospect is that the Soviet Union may achieve military and technological superiority. The Soviet Union could exploit this superiority to shatter the cohesion of the Free World and reduce the United States

to an encircled and isolated position. In such a position the U.S. might then be able to survive only at the cost of its way of life. Further, the unchecked instability of many societies in the Free World, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, will bring increasing opportunities for Communist expansion through economic and political penetration. This expansion could take place even before the Communist obtain a military preponderance .

Only by dedicating itself now to the long, untiring effort required over the next decade can the U.S. avoid disproportionately large expenditures and sacrifices of American lives later when confronted by successively more threatening crises.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX-A

LIST OF INDIVIDUAL PAPERS

In the initial stages of the preparation of this report, individual panel members prepared twenty papers on various aspects of the problem. Many of the suggestions made in these papers appear in the panel report; many do not. The papers will not

be distributed with the report, but a source book containing them will be available upon request in Mr. Rockefeller's office. Each of these papers is the work of an individual, and the substance is not necessarily agreed to by the panel as a whole.

1. A Post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions, (C),by Philip S. Mosely
2. Thresholds of U.S. Effort, (U)by Max F. Millikan
3. Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy, (C) ...by Max F. Millikan
4. General Guide Lines for An American Long-Range Psychological Plan, (C) ...by Stefan T. Possony
5. A Positive Position for the Third Phase of the Cold War, (S)by George Pettee
6. The U.S. Public: A Matter of Orchestration, (C)by C. D. Jackson
7. The Discrete Problems of the Far East, (C)by Paul M. A. Linebarger
8. Policy and Opinion in South and Southeast Asia, (C)by Paul M. A. Linebarger
9. The Middle East and Africa — A Working Paper, (C)by George A. Lincoln
10. Latin America — As A Demonstration Area of U.S. Foreign Policy in Action, (C)by Stacy May
11. The National Costs and Policies Required to Maintain a Modern Weapons System,
(S)by Ellis A. Johnson
12. Arms Equation, (S)by George A. Lincoln in collaboration with William Webster
13. Crucial Problems of Control of Armaments and Mutual Inspection, (S)by Ellis A. Johnson
14. Thresholds of Armament Effort — U.S. and U.S.S.R., (S)by Stacy May
15. Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations With the U.S.S.R., (S) ...by Henry A. Kissinger
16. The German Problem, (S)by Henry A. Kissinger
17. Soviet Evolution, (C)by George Pettee
18. Investigation of NATO, (C)by Stefan T. Possony
19. The Atoms for Peace Program, (C)by Stefan T. Possony
20. The Purpose, Requirements and Structure of an American Ideological Program,
(C)by Stefan T. Possony

Classification: C=Confidential, S=Secret, U=Unclassified

SECRET

ANNEX-B

LETTER INVITING PANEL PARTICIPATION

August 16, 1955

Dear _____:

The recent conference of head of government of the Big Four at Geneva opened up new possibilities and requirements for U.S. action for both the immediate future and for the longer pull.

In carrying out my responsibilities to furnish advice on the psychological aspects of policies followed by the United States, I am particularly anxious to enlist the help of out-side-of-government experts like yourself. The contribution made by such people has proven extremely valuable in the recent past. I desire to continue it in the future.

I would therefore like to invite your participation in a group study and review of the psychological aspects of future U.S. strategy. This study should develop the means and methods best calculated to achieve U.S. objectives, taking into consideration the necessity for an integrated national program within which long-term military, economic, technological, and ideological programs can be developed and financed.

Enclosed you will find information relating to the administrative plans for these discussions. I hope you will be able to join in this effort. I look forward with pleasure to seeing you.

Sincerely,

/s/ NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure
Objectives of the Panel

SECRET

SECRET

OBJECTIVES OF THE PANEL

A Study of the Psychological Aspects of Future U.S. Strategy

I. Problem

1. To study the psychological aspects of possible U.S. strategy in the light of developments at Geneva in order to discover an optimum, integrated national program within which specific long-term military, economic, technological, and ideological programs can be developed and financed.

II. Discussion

2. A central problem of psychological significance facing the U.S. is what means and methods it should utilize to maintain the unity and strength of the Free World in the face of a Soviet peace offensive designed to dissipate the fear and moral superiority which have thus far kept it together. The U.S. must not permit the new international atmosphere to eliminate the moral issue of freedom vs. the spiritual oppression of communism; otherwise, Free World strength and purpose may be eroded away. In addition the U.S. must find some other motivation than fear with which to inspire the efforts of free men for the long pull.

3. It is now a long-range objective of the U.S. to assist the orderly democratic development of those nations outside the Communist bloc. It would seem that perhaps this objective affords the most promising basis for free world unity, particularly if it is built through a common effort to achieve the hopes and aspirations of the peoples. To achieve this objective requires careful long-term planning, financing, and integration of economic programs with other programs. Exclusive reliance on economic aid is not enough. The social, political, military and ideological factors must be integrated with the economic. The U.S. could concurrently exert far more dynamic, evolutionary "idea" leadership which would give the uncommitted peoples of the world

the understanding that democratic solutions to their economic and social, as well as political, problems can be found and that these solutions will be effective.

4. The U.S. has the capability, through technological development, to block the Soviet military threat in every field. The real strength of the United States lies in the dynamic social structure from which its industrial and technological superiority flows. If this strength is effectively mobilized, the United States can overcome the Free World's markedly increased indifference which results from the new Soviet diplomacy and approaching parity in thermonuclear capabilities.

5. To take these steps, national strategic coordination of all pertinent U.S. actions is required. As the President has stated: "... we must bring the dozen of agencies and bureaus to concentrated action under an over-all scheme of strategy." (San Francisco speech, 1952.) Such an "over-all scheme of strategy" should:

a. Establish a basis for Free World cooperation which does not depend on the fear of naked Communist aggression but which rests on the moral ascendancy of human freedom.

b. Achieve actual U.S. and allied military superiority.

c. Assure a rate of economic growth in the Free World superior to that attained in the Communist bloc.

d. Assist free societies to be more effective and more responsive to basic human aspirations than Communist-dominated societies.

e. Create the long-term political, economic and military unity of the U.S.-led alliances, with due understanding of the

SECRET

realities of a nuclear military posture as a basis for achieving a practical armament.

III. Conclusions

6. Current National Security Policy calls for "a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda and other actions . . . so coordinated as to reinforce one another." As a result of the new developments in international affairs a greater need exists for psychological strategy which will provide more specific guidance for departmental and agency programs and which will enable the U.S. to gain maximum psychological advantage from all its actions. To help fulfill this need, it has been agreed to augment regular governmental procedures by forming a study panel. The study panel will be composed of outstanding experts in significant areas. In addition, selected governmental officials should participate as appropriate.

7. A fresh outside look at many of the complex problems confronting the Government can make a major contribution to the development of our evolving national strategy. This contribution can be enhanced if made by outsiders who have had some association with the Government and who are also generally familiar with current procedures and capabilities. Certain official background papers and other necessary information will therefore be given to the study panel.

IV. Terms of Reference

8. The terms of reference of the study panel are implicit in the world situation. An initial survey of the psychological aspects of the political, economic, social, and military factors affecting U.S. security will doubtless result in the panel focusing attention on certain crucial areas of government activity as well as on the major regional problems.

9. Background areas of investigation

a. Major political trends

(1) Assess the likely emerging foreign policies of the USSR and other major nations or groups of nations for the foreseeable future.

(2) Assess the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc vs. the Free World alliance system, the impact and evolution of neutralism and the forces influencing the uncommitted nations and peoples.

b. The military balance

(1) Assess the scale and character of the likely Soviet effort in the arms race over the next five to ten years.

(2) Consider the possible uses, military, political, and psychological to which Moscow might put arms parity or superiority, if they achieved it.

c. Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America

(1) Assess the scale and character of the likely Communist challenge over the next five to ten years.

(2) Consider the possible uses, military, political, and psychological which Moscow (and/or Peking) might make of a position of relative strength.

10. Psychological Aspects of Implementing Programs

a. Consider the kind of U.S. and Free World policy, from the present forward, which would take advantage of the new developments and frustrate Communist purposes and lead to an internal modification of policy within the bloc and result in an accommodation with the Free World on terms acceptable to the U.S.

b. Consider the scale and character of the U.S. and Free World effort required to counter the Communist effort in Europe, Asia, Africa, Near East and Latin America. Estimate the cost to the U.S. and Free World of making the requisite

SECRET

SECRET

economic, social and ideological effort, and the psychological basis for demonstrating the all important long-term self-interest of such a program.

c. Consider the scale and character of the U.S. and Free World effort required to counter the Soviet military effort and intentions. Estimate the cost of the economic outlay to the U.S. and Free World of making the requisite effort and its psychological and political implications.

d. Consider the size and nature of the information program required to maximize sustained public support for the U.S. and allied effort.

e. Consider the creation of new methods whereby U.S. private and governmental actions might better promote regional cooperation.

f. Develop more effective programs for training U.S. officials in the discharge of the U.S. role of cooperative world leadership.

11. Integration

After the foregoing separate elements are explored, the study panel should consider how best to integrate its findings in order to provide governmental departments with useful, definitive psychological guidance. To this end, it should consider:

a. What potential resources, political actions, and strategic possibilities are suggested as offering the greatest promise for attaining a greater degree of peaceful initiative by the U.S.

b. In what respect is it possible to do more effective planning and use resources more efficiently in the light of the new developments.

c. What worldwide, mutually beneficial objectives should be adopted by the U.S. in relation to the Free World and what time phasing is recommended for attaining these objectives?

12. Qualifying Factors

The study group should not merely arrive at a "most likely" projection to achieve psychological strategy objectives, but indicate frankly and explicitly its believed margins of error and its doubts. In suggesting U.S. and Free World countermoves, the study group should indicate the margins of risk and safety which it attaches to the proposed levels of effort and the intelligence assumptions which underlie them. (National Intelligence Estimates will be made available.)

While, in the end, the study group should emerge with a cost estimate, it should define the political and psychological conditions on which the success or failure of such an effort may depend.

SECRET

SECRET